By Dee Smith
The Trump Administration’s action in seizing Venezuela’s president — accomplished through an apparently movie-perfect special forces/combined military action — may be the final nail in the coffin of the Liberal International Order (LIO), also called the “rules-based” international order. It is in addition a textbook example of why it is necessary to look beyond the obvious to understand what is going on in almost any situation.
The LIO was partly a product of the desire of Western leaders, after World War II, to create a system of international governance through multi-lateral institutions (like the United Nations) to manage conflict in order to avoid a repeat of war on such a devastating scale, particularly in the emerging age of nuclear weapons. It was at the same time an effort to grow and maintain the economic and military primacy of the United States and of the West in general.
The LIO largely accomplished these goals for 50-odd years, but the system has been teetering for a quarter of a century. A series of events, including the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Russian invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, eroded its reality and credibility. The first two were conducted with some semblance of international cooperation (a “coalition of the willing”). Russia’s actions, and now the American defenestration of the Chavista regime — not to mention various parties’ recent actions in the Middle East and South Asia — have revealed the LIO as no longer fit for purpose. When no one even tries to look as if they are playing by the rules, it is over. Such a structure is unlikely to be revived any time soon in any recognizable form.
Realpolitik, spheres of influence, balance of power, and other elements of the 19th century geopolitical environment have returned with a vengeance. The open lack of interest many governments display toward the multi-lateral institutions and international law — or their purely self-serving invocation of them — complements the normalization of rising elements such as nationalism, isolationism, non-alignment, and identity-based politics. These occur within as well as among nations.
This, of course, means a much more conflictual world. Decisions that were always based on emotional (particularly fear-driven) factors and desires are now being pursued without even the window-dressing of spreading democracy or any other political philosophy. They are now overtly based on self-interest. They always were, to be honest, but the desire to be seen to be playing by the rules of the LIO provided some amelioration of naked self-serving actions.
Consider the difference between the recent U.S. actions in Venezuela and the seizing of Manuel Noriega, the president of Panama, 36 years ago. The latter was cloaked in the democratizing language of liberal interventionism. No such justification is given for last week’s action. It is presented as simply in the national interest of the U.S. This is a harbinger of how power will be projected and justified in the foreseeable future.
We are increasingly becoming an overt “might makes right” world. That is a reality in which mid-sized nations are more fearful of what the largest nations may do to them, but also in which mid-sized nations feel they have more cover in pursuing their designs on smaller bordering nations.
Things are almost never what they seem. There is still some desire for “cover”, but it is primarily for domestic consumption, as with the drug trafficking charges against Maduro. Conventional wisdom (it is notable that “conventional” wisdom can be almost instant!) now says — buttressed by the statements of President Trump — that the Venezuelan operation was really all about oil. But was it? Given the nature of Venezuelan oil (tar sands, at least onshore), and the penetration of the Venezuelan state by China and Russia, it is arguably much more about China. It reflects the desire of the US to weaken China’s presence so close to America, a presence that would make operations in the Caribbean very difficult for the US in the case of a kinetic war with China.
The implications of this return to an older mode of international dealing, and what that means, should not be underestimated. It is well past dawn in the emergence of a much more conflictual day.
We have seen this movie, and we know how it goes. We don’t know how it ends, but it is very hard to find scenarios that end well in a world bristling with nuclear and more recent weaponry (drones, autonomous killer robots, loitering munitions, lasers and other directed-energy weapons, hypersonic directed missiles, cyber conflict, etc.). It is not your grandfather’s warfare.
The dream of the LIO was in part a result of the horror of nuclear weapons. After the fall of the Soviet Union, I heard an old Soviet general comment that his was the last generation of military and political leaders who had actually walked the field of a nuclear explosion. He believed that, as long as his generation was in charge on all sides, the chances of nuclear exchange were very small . . . but that when they were gone, it would become much more likely. Sadly, we are there.
It can be very hard and troubling to attempt to be truly, analytically objective. It means accepting many things you don’t want to believe or don’t want to admit. There are many who cannot accept that the “one brief shining moment” of the LIO is over. But the Zeitgeist has changed, and the 20th century rules are worn beyond repair. The leaders and nations pursuing more aggressive policies are a reflection of that change. And that change is a reflection of loss of faith in the unfulfilled promises of the old order.
Oh, Brave New World.