Although US President Donald Trump once took some credit for popularizing Juneteenth (June 19), an official national holiday marking the freedom of enslaved Americans, celebrations this week were muted and in some cases canceled. Trump himself did not mention the holiday. Some US businesses also stepped back from it, although not with the speed with which they have moved away from DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) programs, which have been explicitly targeted by the Trump administration (see Signal, “The Rollback,” Feb. 28, 2025). It is not hard to tie this deprecation of Juneteenth to the argument that a form of white nationalism is backed by the White House. SIG’s view, however, is that the reality is more complicated, more politically opportunistic, and of more significance to American business.
The racial politics of the current moment seem to pivot around class and social mobility as much as physical appearance. It should be recalled that DEI efforts were losing popularity before President Trump took office, notably among nonwhite Americans. In the brief period from February 2023 to October 2024 (before Trump’s victory), according to Pew Research, Asian-American support for DEI programs at work went from 72% to 57%, while those with a neutral view rose from 18% to 28%, meaning that those Asian Americans who either opposed DEI or preferred not to venture an opinion had reached 43%. Unfortunately, Pew’s summary of the 2024 research did not highlight the same figures for Hispanic Americans, but in its February 2023 survey Hispanic support for DEI had been significantly weaker than Asian support. Given that the 2024 survey also found a broad decline across groups in support for DEI, it does seem unlikely that Hispanic support for it would have gone up while Asian support plummeted.
Dwindling non-white support for DEI might be related to views on the systemic or otherwise nature of racism in American society. The American Communities Project researches American views on a variety of topics based on a 15-part typology of communities, from Aging Farmlands (91% white, strongly Republican, with low unemployment and low education) to Hispanic Centers (more than 50% Hispanic, about evenly split between the two political parties, with low voter turnout and twice the national average of people lacking health insurance) to College Towns (younger, 78% white, 6% black, mildly Democratic) to the African American South (more than 40% black, 3% Hispanic, strongly but not overwhelmingly Democratic). The ACP also includes communities like Mormons (“LDS Enclaves”), Native American Lands, and Military Posts that rarely surface in statistical assessments of the national community. One can find fault with any of these categories but they have the virtue of complicating the straitjacket of race, income, and education.
One ACP question has been to ask whether you agree or disagree with the statement, “Racism is built into the American economy, government, and educational system.” Just 48% in Hispanic Centers agreed with that statement, a tie with Native American Lands. The lowest affirmative share was in Aging Farmlands (38%), the highest in the African American South and Big Cities (both 58%), College Towns (55%), Urban Suburbs (54%), and Military Posts (52%). The perception of systemic racism was highest in areas with large black populations — the US military is nearly twice as black as the national population — and large shares of better-off and better-educated Americans, the last two categories being disproportionately white although also disproportionately Asian. (Asian households are better educated and wealthier than any other racial or ethnic group in the US.) Unfortunately the ACP does not have an Asian community among the 15.
One can reach any number of conclusions from these surveys, including that white Americans do perceive systemic racism, and more so as they climb the social ladder — although there is also a clear partisan divide on how significant it is. The relationship to social mobility does seem relatively clear. In the ACP studies, Hispanic Centers were the community least likely (37%) to feel that “it is increasingly hard for someone like me to get ahead in America” and also the least likely of the 15 communities to agree (61%) that the US is in decline. In both cases, the community at the opposite end of the optimism spectrum was Evangelical Hubs (90% white, with income and education levels below the national averages, poor health care, and low voter turnout). This is the community that least sees itself as upwardly mobile.
In presidential races, the Republican coalition has, of course, become steadily more Asian, Hispanic, and black. (Asian voters in 2024 were 9% of the Republican coalition.) The Democratic candidates’ Asian support dropped from 74% to 61% from 2012 to 2024 nationally and 70% to 57% in 2024 battleground states. About the same pattern held nationally and in the 2024 battleground states for black and Hispanic voters. In a highly partisan political landscape, nonwhite voters, by leaving the Democratic party, have become a crucial swing vote.
If social mobility is a key factor, then these voting patterns might not be much affected by what happens with either DEI or Juneteenth. Republican politicians have consistently stressed that the United States is a land of opportunity more than their Democratic counterparts have. Hispanics and Asians disproportionately reach for that opportunity, far more than their white counterparts. The number of Hispanic-owned businesses grew 44% from 2018 to 2023 while the number of white-owned businesses slightly declined. Meanwhile, Asians, despite their lower numbers, owned more US businesses than Hispanics or African Americans, and had the largest estimated receipts ($1.2 trillion in 2022, the most recent year for which the census has public data).
At the same time, non-white businesses often do find it harder to attract investment than their white counterparts. A Stanford study argued that if “Latino-owned businesses had the same average revenue as white-owned businesses, it would add $1.1 trillion to the U.S. economy.” In short, there is an under-exploited investment opportunity in the non-white parts of the US economy. The Republican party, at times despite itself, discovered this opportunity in political terms. Investors could discover it in business terms as well.