What is Intelligence - Part #1: Looking for Trouble (@SIG)

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Part 1: Looking for Trouble

By Dee Smith
Chief Executive Officer and Founder

As head of a private intelligence agency—Strategic Insight Group (or SIG)—I am often asked what intelligence is and how it works. How is it different from other kinds of research? So here is a description that I hope will be helpful.

First of all, intelligence is very different from espionage. Traditionally, espionage is the practice of using spies to procure information. A modern variant is of course “cyber espionage”: a kind of cyberattack where the goal is to enter a computer system in an unauthorized and undetected way to access valuable intellectual property (IP) or sensitive or secret information. Espionage is often conducted by governments against other governments, as well as against opposing parties within their own countries. All governments conduct some form of it. It is also used in commercial settings—often called “industrial espionage”—but this is considered unethical and is illegal in most jurisdictions. Government intelligence against other governments is usually not considered illegal in the country in which it originates, or its legality is disregarded. This is because different rules—or a lack of rules—apply to sovereign states. There is a level of anarchy in inter-state relations, as there is no real overarching global legal authority, and what international law there is is weak and is often disregarded and unenforced.

Intelligence is not espionage, but it is also not the same as the general kind of research as undertaken by many people. Often, research on a topic gathers relatively easily obtained information and categorizes, synthesizes, and draws conclusions from it.

In contrast, intelligence is a very specific kind of research with a focus on revealing hidden information—to find things that others do not expect you to know or do not want you to know. The goal is to enable you to more completely understand the nature of a situation and to characterize the forces influencing it. Furthermore, intelligence often strives to provide continuing awareness of how something is developing, and early warning of emerging threats and opportunities.

The goal of any good intelligence operation is to produce “actionable” intelligence: something that a client who uses the intelligence) can act on. Intelligence works best when the question being asked by the client is very specific: “Are there negative indicators that should warn me against investing with this group?” or “Will an opponent in a lawsuit fight to the end or settle?”

Finding things that others do not want you to know might seem ethically questionable, but consider, for example, that many of our clients at SIG are large investors who manage money for ordinary people who have entrusted their retirement savings to pension plans or other investment funds. Imagine the following situation: a fund manager is proposing to make an investment in an entity, but that entity is itself acting unethically by hiding or misrepresenting issues. A good intelligence process could detect this, allowing the fund manager to make a better decision.  

When certain rules and procedures are followed, private intelligence can be conducted entirely legally, as SIG does on a daily basis.
 The intelligence that SIG conducts is essentially threat identification, risk mitigation, and fraud detection: we are “looking for trouble” . . . so we can keep clients—and the people whose money is entrusted to them—out of it.

How does intelligence work? It works by collecting a large array of data—many small pieces, from many different sources, not all of which are decisive or even terribly important. But when you collect the right pieces, and put them together using appropriate tools and techniques, the process can reveal hidden information about actors and their intentions—good or bad—and about their weaknesses and strengths. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The Importance of Patterns

Sometimes a single piece of information can make all the difference. Far more often, however, it is the pattern of evidence that reveals the “lay of the land,” so to speak. You never know, until you begin collecting and analyzing it, what piece of data, from what source, will tell the tale . . .

Consider a subject who suddenly begins to receive speeding tickets or to borrow increasing sums of money. This may be a window into their personal life. Has something changed? If they head an investment fund, is it something so distracting that it might take their eyes off the proverbial ball? Or consider an individual who is found to have 3 bankruptcies, is a defendant in multiple lawsuits, and has tax liens every year for multiple years. What does this pattern across indicators tell you about their operating style?

There are two key elements: 1) multiple sources, because NO one source is dependable, no matter how legitimate it seems and 2) zero-based analysis, in which assumptions that everyone “knows” to be true (even if they are not) are discarded in favor of collecting data, analyzing it, and looking for patterns and anomalies that can reveal the nature of individuals, companies, and events. Then, the intelligence process creates hypotheses that might explain what has been observed, testing them to confirm or contradict them.
Intelligence that produces insight is iterative by nature. A conceptual device known as the “Intelligence Cycle” illustrates the process in a general way. It may circle around several times within a project, as new information is found and analyzed or tested.

Results of the Intelligence Process

Intelligence does not seek to predict the future, but to provide a better understanding of the present. From that, it can allow a user to take action on the basis of early indicators—before irreparable damage has occurred. It can also provide a basis for projecting forward more likely or less likely scenarios. By pinpointing key elements, it can also allow focused systems of monitoring (known as “Indications and Warnings” or I&W in intelligence jargon) to be established as a way of providing continuous “situational awareness.”

In the end, intelligence is only as good as the processes and protocols used in its collection and preparation. But properly conducted, it can produce astonishingly accurate insights to detect problems at an early stage and then to avoid or mitigate them.

Next in the series: The Difference Between Open Source Intelligence and Human Intelligence, and their Uses

Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement (I&W)

Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement

The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, engineered by China in March, received a mostly favorable reception, with analysts suggesting that the process of normalization could alleviate regional tensions and pave the way for a tangible reduction of hostilities between Riyadh and Teheran. Some possibilities that have been aired include a cessation of Iran's interventions in Bahrain, Saudi capital infusions into Iran, and the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation.

But Saudi-Iranian relations are governed solely by self-interest and driven by the intricacies of geopolitics in the region and the emergence of a multipolar global paradigm. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran still aspire to be regional powerhouses and principal actors in this evolving multipolar order. China’s role in bringing them together is itself principally geopolitical. It is intended to improve China’s position in its long struggle with the United States. Whatever peace effects it might have are all to the good, but they were not the point. Neither Iran nor Saudi is especially weary of conflict. The rapprochement is part of a complex power struggle, not an embrace of peace.

It is up to Saudi and Iran to demonstrate that there is any substance to the agreement.  A crucial aspect that has yet to be adequately addressed is the establishment of some foundation of trust between the two nations. Considering their enduring rivalry and a historical backdrop riddled with mutual mistrust, Saudi Arabia and Iran both need to demonstrate some dedication to resolving their differences and participating in productive discourse together. Such efforts have not yet materialized, and until they do, the prevailing geopolitical landscape in the Middle East will persist unchanged, despite the purported reconciliation.

While there may be a convergence of interests in defying the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iran have very different objectives in the region. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) harbors a grand vision of reshaping not only the face of Saudi Arabia within the Middle East but also its standing on the global stage. MBS's decrees are  unquestionable in the kingdom;  Saudi foreign policy is inextricable from his ambitions. MBS has shown no intention of relinquishing power or engaging in conflict de-escalation. Foremost on his agenda is elevating Saudi Arabia to the status of a preeminent power in the Middle East, employing any means necessary to achieve this objective.

The pursuit of hosting the World Cup in 2030 stands as a prominent testament to Saudi Arabia's endeavor to foster international engagement. This initiative, alongside notable undertakings such as the Neom project and the establishment of a desert-based ski resort, exemplifies Saudi Arabia's transformative policy trajectory. But the global battles over Saudi Arabia’s alternative golf league show that much of the world is unwilling to do much more than humor Saudi episodes of over-spending.

Iran’s attachment to the deal is costless. Its gradual movement toward Russia and China is propelled by many factors but peace is not one of them. Iran has chosen this paper peace as a way to position itself better in its struggle with its enemies.

‘’The new era’’ hailed by diplomats of both states is as thin as a straw, for it is sustained by temporary interests and untested alliances in a changing geopolitical landscape that cannot be predicted by anyone, and certainly cannot be controlled by two relatively minor players.

Elections and Earthquakes (I&W)

Elections and Earthquakes

The first round of the Turkish presidential election on 14 May was a disappointment for almost everyone. There was no winner. The opposition was convinced that years of economic mismanagement, along with a devastating earthquake exacerbated by the notorious corruption of the Turkish construction industry, would drive Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from office. His supporters believed that the great man would crush his enemies once again. But as neither side secured more than 50% of the vote, a second ballot needed to be held. When it was, Erdoğan was clearly the winner.

In North America and most of Europe, the result has generally been described as unwelcome and perhaps even disastrous. But is it?

There is little doubt that Erdoğan’s success was due to policies that became ruthless and vindictive following protests against his plans to build a mosque at Istanbul’s Gezi Park in 2013 and a coup attempt against him in 2016. The only two politicians who might have led a credible challenge to his authority both faced criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The press and television stations had been placed in the hands of AKP and its supporters by an obliging judiciary and voices opposed to Erdoğan were rarely heard during the campaign. The result was an election that has been seen as “free but not fair”, although it was not really either. While some degree of irregularity appears undeniable – Turkish nationalist candidates received an astonishing number of votes in Kurdish areas of the country, for example – no one seems to doubt that Erdoğan really won the election. He is therefore in a stronger position than he was before. His reign and his policies will endure for another five years, at least if his health remains robust. 

His undoubted appeal lies in an ability to display a patriarchal authority as well as an unwavering devotion to traditional values that half the country finds inspiring and reassuring. The other half, of course, disagrees. Nevertheless, after more than two decades of AKP government, Erdoğan continues to represent hope for the new middle classes in Turkey that a more affluent way of life will continue even though levels of personal debt have become almost insupportable. Whatever the risks, millions of Turks thought them less alarming than those posed by a rival candidate who had never held a position of greater responsibility than leader of the opposition and who never appeared to be tough enough for the job.

This may be worth remembering, especially in Europe. In the hope of winning the second ballot if he could attract support from the far right, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu promised to expel “more than 10 million” refugees from Turkish territory. Would he have made a serious attempt to do it? Who really knows, but the consequences would have been appalling. Even the risk that he might try would have been profoundly alarming in most of Europe, especially given a war in Ukraine and rising tension in the Balkans. European politicians have years of experience in negotiating with Erdoğan when refugees are used as political weapons, and a known quantity is undoubtedly preferable at a time of rising uncertainty.

Erdoğan also wants something. His position requires the appearance of power as well as the reality of it. Sophisticated American weaponry is fundamental to both, especially as Russian equipment has been seen to be no more effective in Ukraine than Russian tactics. Erdoğan has been allowed by Washington to purchase much of what he wants from the United States, but not yet everything that he wants, including the most advanced versions of the F16. At the same time, he has the ability to grant favors that are of great importance to American strategists, including an agreement that Sweden will have the unanimous support it needs to enter NATO just as Finland has done. There is clearly an opportunity for both sides in the conversation.

Erdoğan’s attitude to NATO is undoubtedly ambivalent. Although a man of considerable intelligence and a politician of extraordinary ability, he has little formal education and no real knowledge of English or other foreign languages. He is therefore suspicious of a world that he sees as alien, even if his attitude tends to be pragmatic and transactional. His ambitions also extend beyond Europe and into Africa and Asia.

While Turkey was certainly involved in the rivalries of the Cold War, it played little more than a supporting role. The alternative at the time, the Non-Aligned Movement or NAM, was in large part a reaction to the bellicosity of the Great Powers, but a new unwillingness to choose sides, often known as NAM 2.0, reflects growing unease or alarm at the implications of a globalized economy dominated by the United States and its rivalry with China and Russia. In countries such as India and Turkey, it is not surprising that a vision of a new international order has also been accompanied by enthusiastic or aggressive forms of ethnic and religious nationalism.

So what will Erdoğan choose? He would naturally prefer Turkish prominence within the enduring structures of earlier decades as well as a leading role in a new NAM 2.0. Can he have both? His country has extended its reach throughout the world by relying on the soft power of its media as well as the harder forms of power displayed in its successful aerial drones. Turkish military technology is highly attractive to foreign investors as well as foreign customers, and it is only one in a series of lucrative possibilities that include property development in Istanbul or along the Mediterranean coast and the growing markets offered by Turkish consumers. For the rest of the world, therefore, Turkey remains tantalizing. In that sense, Erdoğan’s victory has changed little. The claims that it represents a defeat for either American or European interests and that Kılıçdaroğlu would have been a more effective or at least a more amenable president seem excitable as well as condescending.